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1. God’s relation to time: so what?
Ask a hundred Christians if they think that God is in time or outside time. Chances are that
more people will locate God outside time than inside it. But it is also quite likely that many will
have no clear idea about the topic. And I think it safe to suppose that the majority will deem the
question to be of little relevance for their everyday lives.
In this essay I will try to convince you: 
(1) that the question of God’s relation to time is of practical relevance for every believer
(2) that the idea of God being outside time is a philosophically untenable concept which creates
major  clashes  with  Christian  doctrine  and  therefore  that  every  Christian  should  adopt  some
temporalist view of God
To do that, I will present four arguments against the “outside time” view of God. I then
briefly treat the question where the idea of God’s timelessness presumably came from and conclude
with an outlook on problems that temporalist accounts of God must face.
I  shall  use  the  term  “temporalist”  for  all  views  that  locate  God  in  time  and  the  term
“atemporalist”  for all  views that  locate  God outside time.  I  take it  for  granted that  God exists
without  beginning  and  end.  The  corresponding  terms  for  this  aspect  of  God’s  existence  are
“everlasting” on a temporalist account and “eternal” on an atemporalist account1.
2. Atemporalism endorses an abstract concept of God 
The first problem is that atemporalism seems to entail an abstract God who resembles more
an idea than a person. Timelessness seems to entail immutability (changelessness) and immutability
seems to be in conflict with the personhood of God.
To see that timelessness entails immutability, consider Boethius’s famous formula for the
life of a timeless Godhead:
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Eternity is the simultaneous and complete possession of infinite life. (Boethius 1902, Book
V, 161) 
Atemporalists take God’s life to be  all at once, i.e. not spread out through time, but  completely
present in the one eternal “moment”. It seems clear to me that this entails immutability. Change
requires a succession of moments; if there is but one moment in which all that God could possess is
already there, no door is open for change in the Godhead.
In this respect it does not matter whether one construes God’s atemporality as a point-like or an
extended (duration-like) existence. Either way, everything that God is, knows or does is eternally
simultaneously there.
But the roots of divine atemporality go even deeper. Atemporalists often, especially in the
Middle Ages, derived divine immutability from divine simplicity. Divine simplicity means roughly
that God is identical with his attributes2. For example, Thomas Aquinas argues that divine simplicity
entails God’s immutability and his immutability entails his timelessness (Aquinas 2006) la 9, 1; 10,
2.). Divine simplicity clearly is the more basic doctrine; the mediaevals’ belief in it at least partly
explains their strong commitment to divine immutability.
If we take this connection of divine simplicity and immutability at face value, we seemingly
have found the root of atemporalism. But it seems that the tree growing out of that root must bear
foul fruits, for the root is foul. Divine simplicity implies a strange picture of God. For if God is
identical with his attributes, this seems to suggest the bizarre conclusion that he just is a collection
of  abstract attributes. Actually, divine abstractness already appears on the level of immutability.
Though it is logically possible that a living being just does not change, it is an utterly alien thought
to us who know life only hand-in-hand with change. The only “things” we know to be without
change are abstract ideas. 
Against those arguments, an atemporalist will object that it is precisely God’s “otherness”
that distinguishes him from us and makes him God, the supreme being; all attempts to understand
his nature in human or “anthropomorphic” terms are supposed to fail. This objection may obtain,
for all I have said hitherto could show that divine immutability (entailed by his timelessness) makes
God appear remote and abstract to us, not that he is remote and abstract. When we look at more
practical issues, however, the problem of abstractness/remoteness, is exacerbated.
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3. Atemporality is at odds with a natural understanding of petitionary prayer
Timelessness is at odds with a natural construal of petitionary prayer, because it denies the
temporal succession of petition and answer. 
One way to see this is simply this. Suppose I ask God at t1 to heal my mother. At t2 > t1 he heals her
in an instant. Naturally enough, I consider his answer as temporally later than my petition. But this
view can only be true if God is in time. The answer can only be temporally later if God exists at t 1
and hears my prayer and then exists at t2 and acts upon it. On an atemporal account, however, God
exists out of time. Two questions arise here: (1) How can he interact with the world at all? (2) How
can we understand the seemingly temporal succession of petition and answer?
The response to (1) must go something like this: God “sees” the whole of time  all at once and
performs his actions in the world all at once. This leads us seamlessly to an answer to question (2).
It course means that my prayer and his answer happen for God both at once. There is no temporal or
other succession at all! 
It is really hard to see how one can still call this “petitionary prayer”. Stump & Kretzmann made the
attempt to explicate it. They doubt that responses to prayers must occur later than the prayers:
If at 3:00 a mother prepares a snack for her little boy because she believes that when he gets
home at 3:30 he will ask for one, it does not seem unreasonable to describe her as preparing
the food because of the child’s request…consider the case of Hannahs’s praying on a certain
day to have a child and her conceiving several days afterward. Both the day of her prayer
and the day of her conceiving are ET-simultaneous with the life of an eternal entity. If such
an entity atemporally wills that Hannah conceive on a certain day after the day of her prayer,
then such an entity's bringing it about that Hannah conceives on that day is clearly a
response to her prayer,  even though the willing is ET-simultaneous with the prayer rather
than later than it.  
ET-simultaneity is a concept developed by Stump and Kretzmann that gives an account of how two
events (one eternal and one temporal one) can be simultaneous (Stump and Kretzmann 1981). Let’s
assume, arguendo, that ET-simultaneity does give an answer to how an atemporal God can interact
with a temporal world (which e.g. (Swinburne 1993) doubts). Even if it does, it still is at odds with
our natural understanding of prayer.  And  it has a  strange consequence.  For not only would God
know that Hannah prays and answers her prayer eternally simultaneously, but also would he be sad
about Peninna bullying childless Hannah and happy about  Hannah’s joy over her firstborn son
eternally simultaneously.  Defenders of divine simplicity would perhaps either deny that God  has
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such emotional states or hold that he has them all at once as part of his divine nature.  But again,
even if no contradiction can be derived from the atemporalist view here, the gritty aftertaste of an
abstract  God  remains.  After  all,  my  prayer  wouldn’t  change  anything  in  an  atemporal  (and
presumably simple) God, which makes God look lifeless, rather like an abstractum. 
The aforementioned arguments should suffice to show that there is considerable tension between
atemporalism and petitionary prayer naturally understood. The next argument suggests that for an
atemporal God, it is impossible to know that I am “now” praying or that I have prayed to him
yesterday.
4. Problems with divine knowledge of tensed facts
A third cluster of problems with atemporalism arises around God’s knowledge of tensed
facts.  I  will  argue  that  an  atemporal  God  cannot  know  tensed  facts  and  that  therefore  his
omniscience  is  defective  and  ceases  to  be  omniscience,  which  in  turn  clashes  with  orthodox
Christian teachings. 
Tensed facts are facts that contain temporal information, e.g. “Doug plays tennis now” or “Martha
went shopping yesterday between 5 pm and 8 pm” or “Harry will participate in the race next week”.
I deliberately chose those three examples because they represent present, past and future tense. Now
for us there is no doubt that such propositions can constitute knowledge, at any rate present and past
tense facts. We exist now and know of some things that they are happening now; we also know of
some things that they have happened in the past and know of future things that they will (perhaps)
happen. Yet an atemporal God does not exist now nor existed earlier nor will exist in the future; as
pointed out in section 2, he has all of his existence in one eternal “now”. Therefore, even if an he
knows all the details of history, he knows them all at once and not in a temporal order. He would
know “Doug plays tennis” and “Martha goes shopping between 5 and 8 pm”, but Doug wouldn’t be
playing now for him nor would Martha for him have gone shopping yesterday. 
This lack of knowledge constitutes a considerable deficiency in divine omniscience. Even if God
need not know what is logically impossible to know, we rightly expect him to know tensed facts.
The atemporalist has three options to deal with this demand: (1) either scratch tensed facts from the
inventory of divine omnipotence, without argument, a dissatisfying move; (2) scratch tensed facts
by arguing that on an atemporalist account, it is logically impossible for God to know tensed facts
and therefore he need not  know them. This argument,  however is  question-begging, because it
presupposes what it set out to show, namely that it is reasonable to believe in an atemporal God; (3)
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accept a less than omniscient God, which I assume no atemporalist wishes to do. As neither of these
options  seems  desirable,  I  conclude  that  the  problem  of  tensed  facts  at  least  exacerbates
atemporalism’s difficulties. But the most weighty argument is still to come.
5. Logical contradiction concerning the Incarnation
The summit of atemporalism’s difficulties with Christianity lies in its clash with the doctrine
of the Incarnation. Construing the Incarnation atemporally requires the logical contradiction that
part of the Godhead simultaneously has a human body and has no human body.
According to the doctrine of Incarnation, some two thousand years ago God took on flesh
and walked this earth as a man.  One way to put the biblical account is as follows (let t0 be the
moment of Christ’s conception in Mary’s womb):
(i) At at all instants tm < t0, Christ existed as the second person of the Trinity without a human body.
(ii) At moment t0, God took on a human body. 
(iii) At all instants tn > t0, Christ existed and continues to exist as the second person of the Trinity
with a human body. 
Temporalism has no problems at all accommodating the historicity of Christ’s incarnation. A
God that is located in time has a past, a present and a future. Let us go back to the time of Christ’s
incarnation: then t0 is God’s present. In that present, God is about to change in so far that the second
person of the Trinity is about to take on human flesh. With respect to that present, God existed prior
to it as a purely spiritual being. With respect to that present, God continues to exist in the future as a
being of which one part has a body. 
What about atemporalism? As there is no temporal succession for an eternal being, the states
(i)  through (iii)  must all be eternally simultaneous for God.  This is not only counterintuitive,  but
also entails a downright contradiction. Even an eternal being cannot have simultaneous states that
are mutually exclusive. Either Christ has a body or he hasn’t; on atemporalism, both states must be
eternally simultaneously true, which is a contradiction. 
Still, Stump and Kretzmann argue that God’s atemporality is compatible with the historicity
of the Incarnation. Their approach is based on the doctrine of the dual nature of Christ, according to
which Christ eternally simultaneously possesses a divine and a human nature. 
The doctrine of the dual nature maintains that the second person of the Trinity has not
merely one essence or nature…but two: one the divine nature common to all the persons of
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the Trinity, the other the human nature of the Incarnation. ((Stump and Kretzmann 1981), p.
452; emphasis added)
They go on to write that although Christ’s divine nature cannot become temporal, “at some
temporal instants…the human nature of the second person has been temporally actual.” ((Stump and
Kretzmann 1981), p. 453). I see two severe difficulties here. 
First,  even if we take Christ’s human nature to be eternal,  his having a body undoubtedly is a
temporal thing. Whatever it means for Christ’s human nature to be “actual”, he cannot both have a
body and not have it.  Second,  according to the New Testament,  Christ’s having a body is a
continuing state. When he ascended to Heaven, he did so with his body; he shall return to earth as a
bodily being3.  One would have to include Christ’s “incarnatedness”  in the notion of his human
nature to make it compatible with atemporalism.  It goes without saying that this raises massive
problems like the question how the Creator can eternally have,  even partly,  a created body.
Furthermore, it would weaken, if not nullify our awe for Christ’s condescension in becoming a man.
Bible passages like Philippians 2:6-8 would become a sham. For how can we reasonably speak of
Christ  that he “emptied”  and “humbled”  himself by taking on human form, if he had that form
eternally and therefore necessarily?
In  summary:  Christ’s incarnation poses seemingly insuperable challenges for atemporalism.  It
seems that to maintain atemporalism, we would have to give up our traditional notion of Christ’s
Incarnation and opt for one that radically changes our concept of salvation.
6. Whence? Timelessness as a Platonic concept imposed on Christianity
Given the  serious  difficulties  outlined  above,  why have so  many philosophers  and theologians
endorsed the atemporal model? 
Nicholas  Wolterstorff  ((Wolterstorff  1975),  p.  78-79)  lists  two main  factors,  which  I  find most
plausible:
(1) Temporal events are irrecoverable, which constitutes a matter of deep regret for humans;
hence, God must be outside time, so that no event is irrecoverable to him, and no “tooth of
time” gnaws at him.
(2) Hellenistic influences in early Christian theology. The idea that the eternal is superior to
the temporal, even to the everlastingly temporal, is found in Plato; although Plato does not
connect it with divinity,  he obviously influenced early Christian thinkers like Augustine,
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which influenced Christianity as a whole. In connection with (1), it becomes understandable
why this “fateful choice” was never really challenged through the centuries. 
Wolterstorff writes that in the twentieth century, “(a) good many … theologians have been engaged
in what one might call the dehellenization of Christian theology” (Wolterstorff 1975, p. 79). In the
light of sections 2 through 5, this looks like a main project for Christian theology.
7. The atemporalist’s last stronghold: divine foreknowledge
There remains one last  “stronghold” of atemporalism: divine foreknowledge. Atemporalism can
explain divine foreknowledge apparently without endangering human free will, while temporalism
suffers considerable tension here.
Let’s begin with temporalism. Nelson Pike (Pike 1965) conclusively argues that if God has
complete foreknowledge of the future, it is not within our power to refrain from the actions we’re
doing. Clearly, Pike puts God in a temporal setting. If Jones performs an action A at t1 and God has
complete foreknowledge of the future, then God will hold at t0 the belief that Jones will perform A
at t1. In order to be free to refrain from A, (1) Jones would need the power to make God non-
existing at t0 or (2) the power to make God not have the belief that Jones will perform A at t1 or (3)
the power to make God hold a false belief at t0. As none of those options can obtain, Pike concludes
that Jones was not free to refrain from performing A.
Atemporalism seems to have less problems here. For one, God is not in time. There is therefore no
“earlier” and “later” and no backward causation necessary to open up the possibility of free will.
Second, the atemporalist can construe God’s foreknowledge with conditional necessity, as Boethius
suggested:
…there is no necessity to compel a voluntary walker to proceed, though it is necessary that,
if he walks, he should be proceeding. In the same way, if Providence sees an event in its
present, that thing must be, though it has no necessity of its own nature.  (Boethius 1902,
Book V, 165)
On this account, it is necessary that God knows the man walking, but it is not necessary that the
man walks because God knows it. Atemporalism allows this move because for the atemporal God,
all things in time are present all at once in an eternal “present”. Just as we do not necessitate anyone
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whom we see walking before our eyes to walk, so does the eternal God not necessitate anyone to to
do anything, even if he sees all those actions at once and from our viewpoint  foresees all that is
temporally ahead of us. 
If  one  sticks  to  strong  version  of  divine  foreknowledge  (foreknowledge  with  maximal
detail), atemporalism fares better than temporalism. However, I doubt that Scripture forces us to
adopt  such  a  strong  view.  It  is  crystal  clear  that  the  Bible  wants  us  to  believe  in  divine
foreknowledge, and that God knows the future with considerable detail (see, e.g. Is 53; Mt 26:75);
what is not clear is that this biblical picture must be explained with an atemporalist concept of
divine foreknowledge. But this is another story. 
1  I consider the oft-used term “eternalist” for proponents of divine timelessness as misleading. It suggests to be the
exclusive view endorsing divine beginning- and endless  existence,  but  this is  also part  of  most temporalist  views.
Eternalism’s USP is timelessness, not everlasting existence.
2  For example, the propositions „God is good“ and „God is God“ are equivalent, because „God = good“.
3 Acts 1:9-11
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